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SHAREHOLDERS' REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION
OF PROXY RULE 14a-9
by Mark S. Werbner
The corporate proxy has risen to a powerful position in the world of
corporate management. Although the proxy was not recognized at common
law,' solicitation of proxies through a proxy statement is now the principal
device through which corporate management obtains the stockholders'
votes. 2 Congress enacted section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19343 in order to promote full disclosure and "the free exercise of the voting
rights of stockholders." 4 By this statute a large number of corporate proxies
came under federal regulation.5 Section 14(a) makes unlawful the use of the
mail or any instrumentality of interstate commerce or any national securities
exchange for the solicitation of any proxy in contravention of any rule or
regulation promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).6
Pursuant to this rulemaking authority, the Commission promulgated rule
14a-9 which provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy . . . written or oral, containing any
statement which, at the time . . . it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact . . . necessary in order to make the state-
ments therein not false or misleading.7
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 granted the SEC the authority to
enforce the Act and its regulations. 8 All proxy statements within the Act's
scope must be filed with the Commission before the stockholders' meeting
1. McKee v. Home Say, &Trust Co., 122 Iowa 731,98 N.W. 609 (1904); State v. Board of
Directors, 60 Nev. 382, 110 P.2d 212 (1941); Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 38
(1942).
2. Professor Loss has commented:
The widespread distribution of corporate securities, with the concomitant separa-
tion of ownership and management, puts the entire concept of the stockholders'
meeting at the mercy of the proxy instrument. This makes the corporate proxy a
tremendous force for good or evil in our economic scheme. Unregulated, it is an
open invitation to self-perpetuation and irresponsibility of management. Properly
circumscribed, it may well turn out to be the salvation of the modern corporate
system.
2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 857-58 (1961) (citations omitted).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
4. The congressional rationale for enacting § 14(a) was that "[flair corporate suffrage is an
important right that should attach to every security bought on a public exchange." H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). The provision was designed to insure "that proxies
would be solicited with explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for
which authority to cast his vote is sought." Id. at 14. See also Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528
F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975), discussing the congressional intent behind § 14(a).
5. It was in part due to the large number of proxy statements being examined annually
which led to the Court's holding in J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), that a private
cause of action existed under § 14(a). The Court stated that "[t]he Commission advises that it
examines over 2,000 proxy statements annually and each of them must necessarily be ex-
pedited. Time does not permit an independent examination of the facts set out in the proxy
material . I..." d. at 432.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
7. SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970).
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for which they are to be effective.9 The Commission's acceptance, however,
is in no way a concession that the proxy statement is in conformance with
the rules. ' 0
In the heat of a proxy contest the minority faction's request to the SEC
for action is often ineffective." In 1964 the Supreme Court recognized a
private right of action in the shareholder for violation of rule 14a-9 in
addition to the Commission's enforcement powers.12 Increasingly, dissident
shareholders have carried the proxy contest into the federal court system.'
3
Such an action may arise in several different contexts. One common setting
is a corporate merger proposed by the directors.' 4 Litigation may arise
before the shareholders' meeting if a shareholder or a class of shareholders
seeks to block the meeting and the vote on the merger by charging that the
proxy instrument is false or misleading with respect to a material fact.
Occasionally, however, actions are not initiated until after the merger has
been consummated. 5 The aggrieved shareholder of the merged corporation
then takes legal action complaining that the proxy statement was in violation
of rule 14a-9 and seeks monetary relief or even rescission of the merger.
Another typical context in which 14a-9 litigation arises is the annual election
of directors. 16
The courts have been sensitive to the legislative purpose of the proxy
rules.' 7 They have been earnest in their desire to insure an atmosphere of
9. SEC Rule 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1977).
10. SEC Rule 14a-9(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1977) states, "[tlhe fact that a proxy statement
• . . has been filed with or examined by the Commission shall not be deemed a finding by the
Commission that such material is accurate or complete."
11. Part of the reason for this is reflected in the testimony of the Chairman of the
Commission in 1955:
As a matter of policy the Commission has been reluctant to initiate litigation
during a proxy fight in the absence of a material violation of the rules . . . . It
springs in part from an unwillingness to inject the Commission into an election
campaign unless a material violation of the rules is involved.
Stock Market Study (Corporate Proxy Contests): Hearings on S,879 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 1552 (1955) (statement of J.
Sinclair Armstrong).
12. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See generally Comment, Causation and
Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Ainslie v. Sandquist, 270 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1967) (proxy rule action
involving insurgent management and former management over election of directors). See also
notes 14-16 infra.
14. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Southdown, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd sub
nom. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974)
(plaintiffs take nothing in a 14a-9 action involving merger); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-
Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (granting plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment as to liability for federal proxy rule violation in corporate merger); Berman
v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. I1. 1970) (summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-
shareholders for proxy rule violation in connection with merger).
15. See, e.g., Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1971) (shareholders' derivative
action brought after purchase of another corporation's assets, held for defendants due to failure
to prove material misrepresentation in proxy solicitations); Knauff v. Utah Constr. & Mining
Co., 408 F.2d 958 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 831 (1969) (class action by minority
shareholders seeking to void completed merger and to impress certain properties with a
constructive trust).
6. See, e.g., Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Chemetron Corp., 299 F. Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1969)
(action for temporary and final injunction to restrain defendants from voting proxies at annual
shareholders' meeting).
17. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975) (considering purpose of
§ 14(a), but reversing trial court's grant of injunctive relief to plaintiff shareholders); Browning
"fair play" in the solicitation of proxies so that competing interests have
equal opportunities "to communicate with and thereby influence the share-
holders in the exercise of their corporate suffrage rights."' 8 The maxim "for
every wrong, there is a remedy" is tested in the attempt to structure a
remedy for the injured shareholder. The myriad complexities of litigation
brought under rule l4a-9 place an onerous task upon the shareholder who
seeks to enforce his proxy rights.19
This Comment explores the various remedies available to the shareholder
who brings an action under rule 14a-9 and analyzes representative cases to
aid the shareholder in selecting the most advantageous remedy. The extent
to which judicial sensitivity to the competing interests involved affects the
relief granted is noted throughout the Comment.
I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
By the time a shareholder reaches the courthouse he has been embroiled
in a bitter battle in which the outcome often means corporate life or death.
The shareholder may be a part of the faction opposing the liquidation or sale
of the corporate assets, or he may be one that is supporting an insurgent
slate of directors. It is in this context that the shareholder seeks a judicial
solution to support his position. Increasingly, the most likely peg on which
the minority shareholder can hang his cause of action is a challenge to the
proxy instrument issued by the opposing faction.20 By showing a violation of
rule 14a-9 the shareholder may be able to enjoin scheduled shareholders'
meetings, rescind corporate mergers, or invalidate the election of directors.
The courts have been responsive to the context in which these actions
arise .21 In granting injunctive relief, or more often in refusing such relief, the
courts have been aware that "what is generally involved in a proxy fight is a
bitterly fought contest between groups who have substantial financial inter-
Debenture Holders' Comm. v. Dasa Corp., 524 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1975) (giving § 14(a) broad
construction to allow private policing but affirming dismissal of shareholders' action); Schlick
v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975)
(reversed lower court judgment dismissing complaint alleging proxy rule violations in connec-
tion with merger).
18. See, e.g., Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715, 725-26 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1974) (solicitations for extension of voting trust within scope
of proxy rules). See also Tanzer v. Haynie, 405 F. Supp. 650, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (complaint
did state proxy rule violation cause of action); Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), discussed in note 60 infra.
19. The federal courts have candidly recognized the complexities involved in the proxy
rules area. For example, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973), the
court cites several 14a-9 cases which "attest to the problems which the recognition of a private
right of action for violation of § 14(a) in J.L Case Co. v. Borak have thrust upon the federal
courts ....... Id. at 1284 (citations omitted).
20. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1970). Rosenb-
latt involved an attempt by minority shareholders to block the merger of Northeast Airlines,
Inc. into Northwest Airlines, Inc. by alleging violations of both §§ 10(b) and 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act. The court affirmed the lower court's denial of a motion for an injunction on the
ground that the proxy statement was not materially false and misleading.
21. See, e.g., General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). General Time Corporation sought to enjoin the use of proxies by
an independent stockholders' committee organized by Talley to elect directors to General Time
Corporation and ultimately to merge or combine with General Time Corporation.
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ests at stake." 22 The opinions reflect that the injury complained of is read in
light of these circumstances.23
Until a private cause of action was recognized in J.L Case Co. v. Borak
24
there were few cases in which a shareholder was successful in his attempt to
enjoin the voting of proxies. 25 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 con-
ferred upon the Commission the authority to enjoin without bond any acts or
practices in violation of the act. 26 Borak, however, opened the way to
private injunctive relief upon violation of the proxy rules. 27 The Supreme
Court, holding that it was the duty of the courts to provide "such remedies
as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose, ' '28 opened the
door to the issuance of temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunc-
tions, and permanent injunctions 29 in actions founded on a violation of rule
14a-9.
The shareholder seeking injunctive relief faces federal as well as state
statutes requiring the posting of security to protect the enjoined party from
damages it might sustain as a result of a wrongful injunction. Under rule
65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the district court judge has
discretion to require security from the applicant seeking a temporary re-
straining order or a preliminary injunction.30 The amount of security re-
quired will vary with the potential costs and damages which might be
incurred by a party wrongfully enjoined or restrained. When the shareholder
seeks to enjoin a merger, the security required can be prohibitive. Conse-
quently, many shareholders would be unable to avail themselves of this
equitable remedy if courts rigidly applied the provisions. The courts have,
however, at times exercised their equitable discretion to relieve the share-
holders from this prohibitive requirement.3
State laws requiring security for costs in derivative actions have also been
an obstacle for obtaining injunctive relief. 32 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
22. Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
23. In General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 1026 (1969), the court commented: "[I]ssuers of such [proxy] statements
should be held to fair accuracy even in the hurly-burly of election contests."
24. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
25. See Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dissident shareholder group
was allowed to bring injunctive action under rule 14a-9, but could not meet required showing of
probable success).
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1977).
27. The Court in Borak stated "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a
necessary supplement to Commission action. As in antitrust treble damage litigation, the
possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the
enforcement of the proxy requirements." 377 U.S. at 432.
28. Id. at 433.
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
31. Under rule 65(c), which requires security for the issuance of a restraining order or
preliminary injunction, the district judge has discretion in each case to waive the requirement.
See generally Urbain v. Knapp Bros. Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 930 (1955); Bivins v. Board of Public Educ., 284 F. Supp. 888 (M.D. Ga. 1967); Tennessee
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 87 (W.D. Tenn. 1967). See also Bartels v.
Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Wis. 1975); Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). From these cases it can be noted that the court usually is persuaded by the congressional
policy behind enacting a remedial statute so that it will exercise its discretion to open the courts
to the class of people the Congress intended to protect.
32. The state statutes typically allow a corporate defendant in a shareholder's derivative
action to require that the complainant give security for the reasonable expenses, including
counsel fees, which may be incurred in connection with the action.
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Loan Corp.33 the Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey security law which
required a shareholder suing derivatively and owning less than five percent
of the value of the outstanding shares with a dollar value of less than $50,000
to give security for reasonable expenses and counsel fees which the corpora-
tion might reasonably be expected to incur. Many shareholders who found
the state law prohibitive questioned the constitutionality of applying the
state law in light of the comprehensive federal legislation dealing with the
regulation of the securities field. In McClure v. Borne Chemical Co.34 the
Third Circuit held that neither section 10(b) nor section 29(b) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act should be construed to allow state security for
expense statutes to apply to such cases; the court reasoned that the federal
statute was paramount to the state's right to impose a limitation upon the
shareholder. Three years later, in Borak, the Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court decision 35 which had held Wisconsin's statute requiring security
for expenses inapplicable in light of the federal act. Even when the federal
security for costs rule is applicable, the shareholder might circumvent the
requirement by filing an affidavit declaring himself a pauper of the court.16
The federal courts have applied general principles of equity jurisdiction in
ruling on a shareholder's application to enjoin the shareholders' meeting
because of a proxy violation.3 7 This means that the shareholder must show
that he is without an adequate remedy at law and that he will suffer irrepar-
able injury if equitable relief is not afforded to him.38 A three-prong test is
applied for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 39 First, the plaintiff-
stockholders must show that they are likely to prevail on the ultimate relief
sought. Opinions vary on whether the plaintiff must show that the chance
for success is a "fair prospect"10 or a "reasonable probability"'" or "clear
and convincing," 42 but the plaintiff must convince the court that he is likely
to prevail on the merits after a plenary adjudication. This prong is the most
difficult to meet and has been an insurmountable obstacle to numerous
shareholders seeking preliminary relief by way of an injunction. 3 The bur-
den on the plaintiff is analogous to the burden on a movant for summary
33. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
34. 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
35. Borak v. J.1. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970) provides (emphasis added):
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein,
without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes
affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
Failure to grant or deny benefit of this section enabling a party to proceed in forma pauperis
has been held in a civil action in federal court to rest with the discretion of the district courts.
See Williams v. Field, 394 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891 (1968).
37. See notes 38-50 infra and accompanying text.
38. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
39. For an early opinion applying the three-prong test see Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp.
885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Chemetron Corp., 299 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D. Del.
1969); Empire Gas Co. v. Gray, 29 Del. Ch. 95, 46 A.2d 741 (1946).
42. Dunn v. Decca Records, Inc., 120 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
43. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[b]ecause he has
no possibility of success on these theories, a preliminary injunction may not be based on
them").
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judgment. The shareholder must at least make out a prima facie case
entitling him to relief, but may even be required to show the nonexistence of
any substantial issues of fact.' In an area as complex as litigation under rule
14a-9, the plaintiff-shareholder is hard pressed to meet this burden and show
a substantial likelihood of ultimate success.
4 1
The second prong requires that the plaintiff-shareholder show he will
suffer irreparable harm if preliminary relief is not granted. 46 This require-
ment normally does not bar a large number of actions because most share-
holders are seeking an order adjourning the shareholder meeting to a later
date. 47 The action is usually brought only a few days prior to the scheduled
meeting and, therefore, shareholders have found little difficulty in demon-
strating the need to avoid irreparable injury. One notable exception is seen
where injunctive relief is denied on grounds that the remedy of rescission is
available to the shareholder. 48 For example, where a shareholder seeks to
enjoin a scheduled shareholders' meeting in which a vote will be taken on
the acquisition of two business entities by the corporation, injunctive relief
might be denied on grounds that the shareholder can have the purchase
rescinded if he shows a violation of rule 14a-9 at trial. 49 This reasoning will
often whipsaw the plaintiff-shareholder because he may later be denied
rescissionary relief, notwithstanding his ultimate success on the merits.
When the shareholder has shown liability and asked for rescission, he may
be denied this relief because of the harmful consequences a rescission would
have on the corporation. 0
This concern for harm to the defendant-corporation raises the third prong
of the test. The third prong requires that the shareholder show that the
44. In Mack the court denied preliminary injunctive relief and said:
There are substantial issues of fact existing, the full resolution of which can only
be had upon a full scale trial on the merits. I am aware that there is authority for
granting preliminary relief, even when such substantial questions remain, so long
as plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case.
172 F. Supp. at 888; see SEC v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 229 F.2d 123 (2d
Cir. 1956).
45. For a rare example of a court granting a preliminary injunction denying the voting of
proxies solicited by management because of a misleading proxy statement see Cooke v.
Teleprompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975) (reversing lower
court's order granting injunction on grounds that plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable
harm); Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (denying
injunctive relief for alleged proxy rule violations in part due to failure to show irreparable
harm).
47. But see Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In
Levin, discussed in note 61 infra, the court denied injunctive relief in part due to a failure by
plaintiffs to show an irreparable injury.
48. See Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Mack v. Mishkin,
172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). In Abramson a shareholder sued to enjoin the holding of a
shareholders' meeting which was to approve a merger of two corporations. The court stated
that since the acquisition would consist of two separate business entities which would be
operated separately, there would be little difficulty in returning to a status quo if the acquisition
were set aside after trial. This fact persuaded the court to deny the shareholders' prayer for a
preliminary injunction.
49. For a discussion of rescissionary relief see notes 111-125 infra and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973),
discussed in notes 119-20 infra and accompanying text. But see Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (court rejected argument




benefit he would derive from injunctive relief outweighs the harm that the
defendant-corporation will suffer as a result of the injunction. This "balanc-
ing of the equities" often works to the shareholders' detriment since many
times the plaintiff-shareholders own a minute interest in the outstanding
shares of the corporation, whereas the corporate defendant may have assets
valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. In order to even the scales
somewhat, individual shareholders have often framed their actions on be-
half of a class of similarly situated shareholders. The class action may be
essential to the plaintiff's action when the court applies a balancing formula
before exercising its equity jurisdiction.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Lewis51 furnishes a modern example
of the application of the three-prong analysis in an action for violation of
rule 14a-9. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation sought to enjoin an
insurgent committee from soliciting any proxies from shareholders of its
common stock until the committee's proxy statement complied with the
proxy rules. The court denied injunctive relief, finding that the plaintiffs
failed to meet the three-prong test. The court found that the plaintiffs failed
to make a "clear showing of probable success on the trial." 52 After conclud-
ing that the chances that plaintiff would fail to prove its allegations at trial
were "at least even ' ' 53 with its chance of success, the court held that the
plaintiffs had failed to meet the first prong of the test. Moreover, the court
denied equitable relief because the plaintiffs failed to specify how they
would suffer irreparable injury.5 4 The court then applied a balancing test and
dealt the final and fatal blow to the plaintiffs. The court found that the
defendant-committee would be injured more by the injunction than the
plaintiffs would be benefited. The court considered the fact that the defend-
ants "would be at least partially discredited in the eyes of the shareholders
who, being ignorant of the law, would view the injunction as a favorable
adjudication of plaintiff's claim." '55
In Dunn v. Decca Records, Inc.56 a shareholder sought a preliminary
injunction against a shareholders' meeting scheduled four days later. The
shareholder had alleged that the proxy statement issued by the defendant
was false and misleading with respect to the corporate president's salary in
that the figure listed did not include the cost of maintaining a hotel suite as
additional compensation. In denying plaintiff's application for a preliminary
injunction, the court imposed a "clear and convincing" ' 7 burden on the
shareholder to show that she would ultimately prevail in her action against
the corporation. The court characterized the injunction as an "extrordinary
remedy" which should be used "with moderation and only in a clear and
plain case." '58 The court may have been influenced by the fact that the
51. 334 F. Supp. 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
52. Id. at 1399.
53. Id. at 1402.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1402-03. Similar reasoning was followed in Committee for New Management of
Butler Aviation v. Widmark, 335 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
56. 120 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1954).




plaintiff owned only 200 shares of Decca Records and commenced the
action just four days prior to the regularly scheduled annual stockholders'
meeting. The judge ruled on the application for an injunction the day of the
scheduled meeting. The judge expressed his concern for the equities of the
corporation and said "[I]f my decision were otherwise, . . . confusion,
anxiety and uncertainty would result as well as substantial expense to the
company." 5 9 Although this balancing of the equities is probably always
considered by the courts, it may often be an unexpressed factor.
The courts apparently are hesitant to indicate openly that the number of
shares owned by the plaintiff enters into whether injunctive relief will be
granted; perhaps this is because it permits the decisions to be rendered on a
case-by-case basis. Since the relief sought is equitable, the courts should not
feel restrained to acknowledge openly this balancing process, and recognize
that equitable relief legitimately rests in the discretion of the court.
A good example of a court's balancing the equities and candidly giving
weight to the number of shares owned by the plaintiff is Poirier v. Welch.'
The defendant corporation had approximately 130,000 shareholders with
some ten million shares of stock outstanding. The court balanced these facts
against the plaintiff's ownership of only 210 shares.
This disproportion is a matter that the Court may well consider in
determining the equities of the present application. On the other hand,
the corporation has gone to considerable expense in sending out notices
and proxies for the meeting. A considerable number of shareholders
have replied that they will be personally present and are planning to do
so. It would obviously be a great inconvenience and an unnecessary
expense to the corporation and the stockholders who intend to be
present if this Court were to stay the holding of the meeting. 61
When a court invokes this type of balancing the small shareholder will
inevitably be denied equitable relief. This fact should make clear the great
advantage in bringing a class action shareholder suit since such suits are
more likely to avoid the bite of the balancing test than an action by a small
shareholder alone. A plaintiff-shareholder, by bringing the action on behalf
of all shareholders similarly situated, will be much better equipped to dem-
onstrate to the court that the benefits to be derived by granting the injunc-
tive relief outweigh the harm which will be caused the defendant-corpora-
tion.
In Curtin v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.62 the holder of a single
share of AT&T common stock sued the corporation to enjoin the scheduled
59. Id.
60. 233 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1964).
61. Id. at 439. See also Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), where six stockholders of MGM sought temporary injunctive relief to prevent the
defendant-corporation from using the offices and employees of MGM to solicit proxies in an
upcoming annual stockholders' meeting. The court's balancing of the harm to the defendant and
the benefits to be derived by the plaintiff is seen in the following statement:
It is the concern of the law and of the Court that [the shareholders] be fully and
truthfully informed as to the merits of the contentions of those soliciting their
proxy. It is equally important that the Court should not unnecessarily exercise its
injunctive power in such matters lest such judicial action operate to unduly
influence a stockholder's decision as to which faction should receive his proxy.
Id. at 801. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show a right to relief or any irreparable
harm and, therefore, denied the relief sought.
62. 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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annual stockholders' meeting in order to block adoption of a proposed
pension plan. As might be expected under a balancing approach, the court
denied injunctive relief and allowed the meeting to take place as scheduled.
The court stated that to do otherwise would "seriously upset pending plans
and purposes of one of the world's largest corporations"6 3 and would burden
the company by resulting liabilities estimated at approximately $100,000.
"[M]oreover, confusion, uncertainty and even anxiety would probably dis-
turb thousands of the stockholders of the defendant."' 6 The court found
these consequences too potentially harmful to justify the issuance of pre-
liminary relief.6
5
It is appropriate to inquire into the validity of such a "balancing of the
equities" approach in the context of proxy rule violations. Should a share-
holder who will be injured by the solicitaiton of proxies through a false or
misleading proxy statement be denied injunctive relief based upon the size
of his investment? The balancing process includes a weighing of the public's
interest as well as the interests of the shareholder and the corporation.
Certainly, the public has an interest in the protection of its investments. The
balancing process, however, should also weigh the public's interest in the
vitality of the economic sector. The courts must be mindful of the economic
impact to the business community of an approach which ignores the poten-
tial expense and consequences to the corporation which would result from
the ability of a small shareholder to paralyze corporate business. Even
though the purpose of the proxy rules is to guarantee full disclosure so that
the investor may cast an informed vote, the remedies available to enforce
the rules must be applied with a great deal of flexibility. 66
Since the first prong of the three-prong analysis requires a showing of the
probability that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, the question of liability
clearly enters into a court's determination to award preliminary injunctive
relief. A review of many of the cases denying injunctive relief to sharehold-
ers alleging a violation of rule 14a-9 indicates that the courts' decisions are
often framed in terms of the plaintiff's failure to show that the omission or
falsity was "material," 67 as the rule contemplates. The courts have applied a
different burden of materiality depending upon their views of the equities,
63. Id. at 197.
64. Id.
65. The courts have shown concern for the effect postponement of the shareholders'
meeting will have on the shareholders not involved in the litigation. In Abramson v. Nytronics,
Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court said, "the issuance of an injunction may
be understood by [the] shareholders as evidence that we are of the opinion that there has been
wrongdoing on the part of [the] management."
66. In Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (944), the Supreme Court commented on the
value of flexible equitable jurisdiction.
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. ...
The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as
well as between competing private claims.
Id. at 329-30.
67. See, e.g., General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1%8), cert.




so that this ostensible reason for the court's decision often appears to
involve the same sort of balancing as was discussed above.
The two most widely held tests of materiality are: (1) that material facts
include all facts which a reasonable shareholder might consider important,'
and (2) whether a reasonable man would consider the fact important in
deciding on his course of conduct. 69 The Supreme Court has recently an-
nounced that the proper test of materiality is the "would" test. In TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.7° the Court held:
[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote . . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available.7"
The test of materiality adopted by the Court makes it more difficult for the
shareholder to prevail on the liability issue. Because the three-prong test
must be met before an injunction will issue, the adoption of the "would"
test will impose a heavier burden on the shareholder seeking a preliminary
injunction. The Court's opinion can be read as suggesting that the "would"
test of materiality was followed to avoid setting the threshold of liability too
low.72 Now that the Court has adopted this higher standard there might be
less of an opportunity for the lower courts to apply varying standards based
upon balancing the equities.
II. MONETARY RELIEF
Although injunctive relief may be the most appealing remedy for the
minority shareholder, the foregoing discussion indicates some of the dif-
ficulties in obtaining such relief. Therefore, a shareholder will often seek
monetary damages along with injunctive relief. The measure of damages
recoverable by a shareholder injured by a false or misleading proxy state-
ment is similar to traditional damage theories, 73 albeit somewhat more
complex.
68. See, e.g., Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975) rev'd, 426
U.S. 438 (1976); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968);
Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434, 441 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
69. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Richland v.
Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
70. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
71. Id. at 449.
72. The liability for a rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if the standard of
materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the corporation and its manage-
ment be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements, but
also, management's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it
simply to bury the shareholder in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that
is hardly conducive to informed decision making. Id. at 448-49.
73. The Supreme Court, in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 64 (1975) (citing
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)), said that "the questions of liability and
relief are separate in private actions under the securities laws, and . . . the latter is to be
determined according to traditional principles."
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One common measure of damages is the "out-of-pocket" expenses sus-
tained by the shareholder. 74 A shareholder who has suffered a loss on the
value of his investment because of the decline in the value of his stock will
only be made whole if he is able to recover the difference between the true
market value of the stock and its value if the proxy statement had not been
false or misleading with respect to material facts.
The greatest measure of damages from the shareholder's point of view is
restitution. This measures the shareholder's damages by "disgorging the
profits" realized by the violation of rule 14a-9 and awarding the amount to
the injured shareholders. This remedy often results in a windfall for the
shareholder, yet it is an often invoked measure of damages for the sharehol-
der seeking monetary relief under the federal securities acts and regula-
tions.75 Of course, the shareholder must always base his claim upon actual
damages, that is, a financial loss. 76 The Supreme Court in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co.77 said, "In short, damages should be recoverable only to the
extent that they can be shown." 78 The Court recognized that trial courts
have the power to order an accounting to determine the shareholder's loss
due to materially false or misleading proxy statements.
In Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co.79 certain shareholders brought a
class action suit alleging that they had been damaged by a false and mislead-
ing proxy statement issued by the defendant-corporation and its directors.
The plaintiffs alleged that a proxy statement issued by the defendants
seeking approval of a merger of their corporation into R.J. Reynolds Tobac-
co Co. was false and misleading in that it failed to disclose that certain
directors of the target company were receiving $50 in cash per share for their
stock while the other common shareholders were receiving Reynolds pre-
ferred stock. The court found that the Reynolds preferred stock had a fair
market value of $41.75 on the first day of t4ading after the merger was
approved. After finding that the defendants' failure to disclose this informa-
tion in the proxy statement was a violation of rule 14a-9, the court then
determined that the defect in the proxy statement resulted in the defendants'
receiving a premium on their shares of $8.25 per share. The court allowed
the plaintiffs to recover their pro rata share of the premium realized by the
74. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963), holding that the shareholder must show a direct financial injury proximately caused
by a violation of rule 14a-9 before he is entitled to monetary relief. See generally Note, Private
Remedies Available Under Section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 55 IOWA
L. REV. 657 (1970).
75. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Ohio Drill &
Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d
795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
76. See Schy v. Susquehanna Corp , 419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970), where dismissal of complaint alleging federal proxy rule violations for failure as a matter
of law to show damages was affirmed on appeal. But cf. Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp.
1031, 1033 (N. D. I1. 1970) ("a plaintiff who can prove a violation of the proxy statute is entitled
to a judgment regardless of financial injury").
77. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
78. Id. at 389.
79. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
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defendants in order to compensate them for the loss of an opportunity to
secure a more favorable merger agreement.8 0
The court in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc." refused to allow the plain-
tiff-shareholders a recovery based on the highest intermediate value of the
assets of the merged corporation between the date of the merger and the
date of judgment. Plaintiffs' measure of damages would have allowed a
recovery of the post-merger appreciation of the merged corporation's assets
on the theory that had it not been for the false and misleading proxy which
led to the merger, they would have realized this appreciation as profits. The
court found this argument "too simple," 82 stating that "an adequate disclo-
sure would not necessarily have led to an abandonment of the idea of a
merger . . . the utmost consequences would likely have been a demand for
postponement [of the merger] .... 83 Further, the court would not as-
sume that the shares would have been sold at their highest value between the
time of the merger and the judgment.84 Such a measure may be allowed, but
only in certain limited circumstances; for example, when the value of the
assets steadily appreciates from the date of the merger. 85 The court deter-
mined that the proper measure of plaintiffs' recovery was the value of the
profits realized by the defendants, plus pre-judgment interest.
Pierce J. LeLandais & Co. v. MDS-Atron, Inc. 86 held that the plaintiff-
shareholders were under an obligation to mitigate damages arising out of
their acquiescence in a merger caused by a proxy statement violative of rule
14a-9. A thirty-day period running from the effective date of the registration
statement was imposed during which the plaintiffs should have disposed of
their stock to mitigate their damages. Those shareholders who held their
stock for longer than thirty days were denied recovery for any decrease in
value after the thirty-day period. The court treated those holding their stock
beyond this period as having made a new investment decision. 7 The court,
therefore, attempted to place the plaintiffs in the same position they would
have enjoyed had they received the omitted information in the proxy solici-
tation.
Although the shareholder is entitled to be put in substantially the same
position he would have occupied absent the fraud,8 8 the shareholder's prob-
lem is that by the inherent nature of the open market system his investment
is uncertain, and his actual damages are often too speculative and remote to
be recovered. The principle that a wrongdoer should not profit from his own
80. Id. at 784 n.29.
81. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at 1305.
83. Id.
84. The court dispels the notion that "the highest intermediate value" is proper, and
refused to follow Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). 478 F.2d at 1305 n.26. Myzel had held that a jury may consider subsequent increases in
value of stock in measuring a lob-5 plaintiff's damages for sale of a security without full
disclosure from the defendant. The court said that this theory is too "untenable and speculative
to support an award of damages." Id. at 1305.
85. Id.
86. 387 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 543 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 786, 50 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1977).
87. Id. at 1331.
88. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 (1937).
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misconduct, however, militates in favor of requiring that the profits realized
by the wrongdoer be disgorged to the benefit of the shareholder.
The injured shareholder may also seek punitive damages in addition to the
recovery of the wrongdoer's profits. A shareholder's allegations that a false
proxy statement was used to achieve an illegal merger and that other share-
holders had breached their fiduciary duty by discontinuing their lawsuit to
enjoin the merger has been held sufficient to state a claim for punitive
damages.89 The greatest barrier to the recovery of punitive damages for a
rule 14a-9 violation comes from language in the 1934 Act.9 Section 28
provides as follows: "[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages
under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of
judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of.' 91 This statutory prohibition
has been interpreted by the courts to prevent the recovery of punitive
damages for violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.92 A recent
inroad, however, has been made by way of recovering punitive damages
under a state law claim. 93 One writer has concluded that the recovery of
punitive damages should not be allowed because harsh penalties already
exist for violation of the federal securities laws. 94 The writer goes on to
suggest that punitive damage recoveries would have only a "marginal ef-
fect" on deterring undesirable conduct. But in light of the difficulty a
shareholder has in recovering for a violation of rule 14a-9, punitive damages
may well be necessary to provide the beneficial effect of deterring false and
misleading proxy solicitations. 95 Such relief, however, is unlikely to be
forthcoming without a congressional amendment to the 1934 Act.
Another element of monetary relief which a shareholder may seek for
violation of rule 14a-9 is the recovery of attorney's fees. The recovery of
attorney's fees can be founded on one of two theories. First, that the
89. Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
90. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
91. The term "actual damages" has most often been interpreted as "out-of-pocket"
expenses. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
92. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Flaks v.
Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 975 (1973); Reid v. Mann, 381 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Burkhart v. Alison Realty
Trust, 363 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
93. See, e.g., Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1972); In re Caesars Palace Sec.
Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Young a suit for monetary relief arising out of
an alleged fraudulent securities scheme was brought under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the Utah
Blue Sky Law, UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(l)(b) (1953), and on common law fraud principles. In
addition to an award of $263,800 in actual damages, the trial court awarded $50,000 punitive
damages. The Tenth Circuit would not construe § 28 of the 1934 Act as destroying investors'
rights under state law claims and, therefore, sustained the award of punitive damages and
attorney's fees as permitted under the Utah Blue Sky Law. 466 F.2d at 1338.
Caesars Palace cites Young v. Taylor in support of its holding that punitive damages are
recoverable where the complaint alleges common law fraud in addition to a violation of the
federal securities laws. Since the applicable state law allowed recovery of punitive damages for
common law fraud, the court held the plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages was proper. 360 F.
Supp. at 394.
94. Comment, Punitive Damages in Implied Civil Actions Under the Securities Acts, 74
DICK. L. REV. 466 (1970).
95. See Note, Private Enforcement of the Federal Proxy Rules: Remedial Alternatives, 15
WM. & MARY L. REV. 286 (1973), where punitive damages as well as recovery for attorney's
fees is suggested as a means of encouraging private enforcement of the proxy rules.
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shareholder who has brought the action on behalf of all shareholders should
be entitled to recover his expenses from the other shareholders." The other
rationale allows the recovery of attorney's fees from the defendant as a
penalty for his wrongdoing. This rationale is difficult to support in light of
the general reluctance by the courts to award punitive damages in the 14a-9
context.
The allowance of attorney's fees from the fund recovered when a suit is
maintained as a class action is not truly a recovery of attorney's fees since it
merely allows the plaintiff to skim a portion off the top of his recovery in
reimbursement of his expenses. This benefit for the shareholder bringing the
suit on behalf of a class of shareholders was recognized by the Supreme
Court as early as 1882. 97 In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.98 the majority
opinion noted that "the courts have increasingly recognized that the ex-
penses incurred by one shareholder in the vindication of a corporate right of
action can be spread among all shareholders through an award against the
corporation . . . . 99
Somewhere in between these two rationales is the view that an award of
attorney's fees can be justified as it supports the public's interest in the
private enforcement of federal remedial legislation. 1°° In Mills the Court
opened the way for awarding attorney's fees, notwithstanding the absence
of express statutory authorization under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act. The
Court could find- no legislative intent in the Act which would limit a court's
power to grant attorney's fees when the court found such relief appropri-
ate.' 0 The Court was influenced by the judicial history of a private cause of
action under rule 14a-9. Because there were no "express remedial provi-
sions which were intended to mark the boundaries of the power to award
monetary relief in cases arising under the Act,"' 12 the courts could structure
whatever remedies were appropriate. The decision is especially significant
because it was concerned with the benefit of a 14a-9 action to the public, not
with the benefit to the other shareholders in the class. "In short, the Court
granted an award for acting as a private attorney general."1 3 The effective
enforcement of the 1934 Act would suggest the shifting of the attorney's
fees to the successful plaintiff as a necessary part of any action which is
intended to expose corporate abuse. °4 The Court in Mills v. Electric Auto-
96. Bleznak v. C.G.S. Scientific Corp., 387 F. Supp. 1184 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Bosch v.
Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
97. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). In Greenough the plaintiffs sued on behalf
of all bondholders of the corporate defendant. The plaintiffs recovered damages for the
corporation's waste and misapplication of the assets securing the corporate obligations. The
Court allowed the plaintiffs to recover their costs and attorney's fees from the fund under the
Court's control.
98. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
99. Id. at 394.
100. See Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 316 (1971).
101. See also Comment, The Changing American Rule Against Attorney Fee Shifting, 28
Sw. L.J. 542,(1974).
102. Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 721 (1967).
103. Comment, supra note 100, at 327.
104. See, e.g., Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L.
REV. 784, 816 (1939) ("the award of counsel fees to the successful minority shareholder. . . is
a necessary concomitant of allowing the stockholder's derivative suit, which is vital to the
exposure and redress of corporate abuse").
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Lite, did, however, expressly state that the allowance of attorney's fees was
not meant to saddle the unsuccessful party with the expenses, but rather to
impose them on the class that had benefited from the expenditure. 5 This
language has been read by the Second Circuit as allowing only a recovery
out of the successful plaintiff's fund and not a judgment against the defend-
ant. 1°6 The Second Circuit, however, went on to say that on remand the
district court could require the defendant to pay a proportion of plaintiff's
attorney's fees if it is found that the defendant acted in bad faith through use
of dilatory tactics during the trial. 07 The Act gives the district court judge
discretionary power to require a party to pay costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees, if he believes a suit or defense under any section of the Act
was without merit. 0 8 The Gerstle case clearly allows a shareholder to
recover from the defendant that portion of its attorney's fees expended in
prosecuting against a frivolous, bad faith defense by the defendant-corpora-
tion. The court's opinion should not be read as allowing punitive damages
against a defendant in a 14a-9 action for its bad faith violation of rule 14a-9.
The court was certainly referring to the bad faith involved in the litigation of
the suit, not the bad faith in violating the rule. The district court judge so
understood the court's opinion, as is evidenced by his remarks after remand:
"If there is to be any such charge [for attorney's fees], it must be predicated
upon the principles enunciated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and
not for any punitive purposes."' °9
III. RESCISSIONARY RELIEF
Perhaps the most powerful weapon in the shareholder's arsenal is rescis-
sionary relief. This retrospective relief, when obtained by the shareholder,
allows consummated corporate transactions to be "unwound.""110 The typi-
cal context in which such relief might be sought is where a corporate merger
has been approved at the shareholders' meeting. The dissatisfied sharehold-
er may not have been aware of the material misstatement in the proxy
statement until after the merger has been completed and the stock ex-
105. 396 U.S. at 396-97.
106. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Smith v.
Manausa, 385 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
107. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1309-10 (2d Cir. 1973).
108. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § I 1(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) provides:
In any suit under this or any other section of this subchapter the court may, in its
discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a
party litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be
assessed in favor of such party litigant . . . if the court believes the suit on the
defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient to reimburse him for
the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in connection with such suit ....
For cases supporting an award of attorney's fees for violation of securities laws see generally
Rucker v. La-Co., Inc., 4% F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1974); Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344 (2d
Cir. 1972); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); SEC
v. Capital Counselors, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 654 (2d Cir.
1975).
For cases not allowing recovery of atorney's fees see .cnerally Pierre J. IeLandais & Co. v.
MDS-Atron, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 543 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Smith v. Manausa, 385 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
109. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 638, 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
110. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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changed pursuant to the transaction. The shareholder who finds that his
stock has depreciated may be looking for judicial aid in avoiding the loss. If
the shareholder can prove that the form of proxy violated section 14(a) and
rule 14a-9, he may ask the court to rescind the merger. Because of the
difficulty and burden imposed upon the corporations, this extraordinary
remedy whereby the merger is unscrambled is threatened more often than
applied.
The power to rescind a completed corporate transaction because of a
violation of the proxy rules was not even recognized for some time.11 In
Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp. I2 the court considered the power to
rescind a corporate merger, based upon a false proxy statement, in terms of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court could find no evidence of a congres-
sional intent to create a right to rescind completed mergers. The court held
that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine the "consequent
effects of the validity or invalidity"' 113 of the proxies, but only had subject
matter jurisdiction to consider the validity of the proxies solicited." 14
The United States Supreme Court, however, held in Mills that restrospec-
tive relief for violation of the proxy rules should be considered in the same
manner as it would be for any "similar illegality or fraud.""115 This broad
recognition of the power of the court to rescind a completed merger greatly
expands the shareholders' remedies upon a violation of rule 14a-9. The
Court, however, was careful to state that this remedy is within the power of
a court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction rather than a right lying with
the shareholder." 6 The Court recognized that "nothing in the statutory
policy requires the court to unscramble a corporate transaction merely
because a violation occurred."" 7
The Court in Mills leaves no guidelines for the lower federal courts to use
in determining when rescission is appropriate. The Court merely states that
courts are to use "the sound discretion which guides the determinations of
courts of equity.""' 8 The lack of clear guidelines may have contributed to
the lower courts' frequent refusal to exercise this power of rescission.
Shortly after the Court handed down its opinion in Mills, the Seventh
111. Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1956). The court stated:
There is no basis in the statute or its legislative history for an implication that
Congress intended to give an individual stockholder, as an incident of his protec-
tion by proxy statement regulation, the right to rescind completed corporate
transactions whenever based upon votes solicited by such statements. . . .The
drastic nature of such relief and the ease with which it could have been expressly
authorized if Congress had so intended all argue against such an implication.
Id. at 513.
112. 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).
113. Id. at 214.
114. For a rare example of a court's ordering a shareholders' meeting and proxies "voided"
for the violation of rule 14a-9 see Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Del.), aff'd, 453 F.2d
876 (3d Cir. 1971).
115. 396 U.S. at 386.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing the lower court opinion, 403 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1968)).
118. The Court does suggest that the lower courts keep in mind the role of equity as "the
instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs
as well as between competing private claims." Id.
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Circuit in Swanson v. American Consumers Industries, Inc. 119 held that "the
best interest of the shareholders as a whole"' 20 was a proper factor to be
considered by the district courts in deciding to exercise their discretionary
power of rescission.
One reason often given by the courts in refusing to order a corporate
merger rescinded is the doctrine of laches. In Walpert v. Bart2 ' the court
refused to set a consummated merger aside, finding that the plaintiff-share-
holder was barred by laches.122 The plaintiff owned 100 shares of the
acquired corporation. On June 20, 1966, the merger was approved at the
annual shareholders' meeting. Plaintiff did not initiate an action or voice his
dissatisfaction until August 11, 1966, when he filed a derivative action
against the acquiring corporation. The court stated that laches was appropri-
ate because the plaintiff had lulled third parties who thought the merger was
not being contested into buying stock in the open market. The plaintiff could
have avoided this obstacle to rescissionary relief by either (1) informing the
acquiring corporation that he opposed the merger before the meeting and
informing it that the proxy statement was being studied for its legality, or (2)
informing the acquired corporation as soon as he decided to take legal action
instead of waiting for over six weeks to file the action."'
The Walpert decision cannot be criticized as its purpose in denying the
relief is clearly to protect innocent third parties who have intervened. Some
courts, however, have based their denial of preliminary injunctive relief on
the grounds that the shareholder has an adequate remedy of rescission if he
shows himself entitled to relief at the trial on the merits. 2 4 This treatment
often results in the plaintiff-shareholder's being whipsawed in that he may
meet the requirements shown above but still be denied rescissionary relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts' reasoning in the proxy rule cases, although seemingly disin-
genuous at times, is based in part on the courts' legitimate concern in
119. 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973). The plaintiff-shareholder sued to rescind a reorganization
agreement which provided for the merger of the corporation with another company which
would result in the liquidation of the corporation's assets. The court found that the exchange
ratio of five shares of the liquidating corporation's stock for one share of the acquiring
company was fair and reasonable and that setting aside the merger would not be in the best
interests of all of the shareholders. Id. at 519.
120. Id.
121. 280 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd, 390 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1968).
122. The court stated that the doctrine of laches is applicable "only when one has knowledge
of his rights, but he refuses to take the necessary steps to enforce them until the other party has
in good faith so changed his position that he cannot be restored to his former state if the right is
enforced." Id. at 1017.
123. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1974), in which an action was brought under the fraud provisions of the
1934 Act. The court denied the plaintiff's request for rescission, applying the doctrine of laches
as a bar to such relief. The court placed the burden on the plaintiff to show that he had acted
with reasonable dispatch in seeking rescission of the corporate transaction. Since the burden
was put on the plaintiff, the defendant-corporation was not required to plead estoppel or waiver
as an affirmative defense.
124. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (court rejects argument that party
is barred from seeking rescission of merger simply because he failed to seek injunction before
merger was completed).
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protecting the public interest in a healthy and stable economic environment.
Prior to the recent TSC Industries case, many 14a-9 actions could be
successfully maintained on a shareholder's showing that the defect in the
proxy statement "might" have affected a reasonable shareholder's vote.
This weak test of materiality must certainly have influenced the courts in the
withholding of their discretionary equitable jurisdiction. Now that the test
has been tightened-up, the courts should be more inclined to put teeth into
the private enforcement of the proxy rules and allow more shareholders
equitable relief once the burden of liability has been met.
